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Relational Contract Theory and
Sovereign Debtt
I. INTRODUCTION
An old adage was given modem relevance by a prominent Brazilian
banker at the onset of the developing countries' debt troubles: "If I owe a
million dollars, then I am lost. But if I owe fifty billions, the bankers are
lost." The treatment of sovereign debt since 1982, however, does not
support this thinking. Major banks have broken their patterns of
rescheduling,2 and the developing countries' debts have not been for-
given. Rather than expound further upon the origins of the "debt cri-
sis,"3 this Comment approaches the problem of sovereign debt in terms
of "relational contract theory"4 and assesses the sovereign loan agree-
t Lowden-Wigmore Award for Outstanding Student Journal Writing, 1988.
1 A. SAMPSON, THE MONEYLENDERS 253 (1982).
2 "Country lending, it is sometimes said, is free of final bankruptcy and definitive loss. All that
is needed is occasional rescheduling that gives the lender a breathing space .... H. Wallich,
International Lending and the Role of Bank Supervisory Cooperation: Remarks at the International
Conference of Banking Supervisors 3 (Sept. 24, 1981), quoted in Reisner, Default by Foreign Sover-
eign Debtor An Introductory Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 5. Simple rescheduling is no
longer the only remedy for developing country debtors, as seen in recent restructurings. See infra
notes 125, 132 and accompanying text. In addition, banks have recognized the possibility that sover-
eign loans may be uncollectable, as many lenders have begun to establish large loan loss reserves, and
even write-off the debt of some nations. See infra notes 128-29.
3 See generally W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE
(1984)[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL DEBT]; D. LOMAX, THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT CRISIS
(1986); Barnett, Galvis & Gouriage, On Third World Debt, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83 (1984); Eskridge,
Les Jeux Sont Faits" Structural Origins of the International Debt Problem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281
(1985).
4 Relational theory is a cluster of thinking which emphasizes the interests and behavior of par-
ties in ongoing relationships external to the formal legal institutions of the state. There are two
strands of this theory, one general, and one focusing on contract. Relational theory's main develop-
ers in the domestic contractual setting are Professor Ian Macneil and Professor Stewart Macaulay.
See, ag., I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Macaulay, An Empirical View of Con-
tract, 1985 WiS. L. REv. 465. Relational contract theory emphasizes the behavior of contracting
parties outside the formal terms of the contract and contract law, and attempts to enunciate princi-
ples and norms of exchange which more accurately describe modem exchange than does conven-
tional contract theory. The more general strand of relational theory does not focus as much on
contractual behavior, but rather on a community's operation where no enforcing power of the state
is possible or needed. Developing country debt (and international law in general) was earlier ex-
plored in this general "relationist" context by Professor Gidon Gottlieb. Gottlieb, Relationism:
Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1983).
This Comment attempts to apply the more specific strand of relational contract theory to sover-
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ment in light of that theory's insights and normative lessons. The over-
arching thesis of this assessment is that as bankers and economists design
new ways to deal with sovereign debt,5 lawyers should examine their
roles as advisers, negotiators, and drafters in restructurings with an eye
towards more actively formalizing treatment of sovereign debt.6 The
tools of relational theory will be used to aid the lawyer in this challenge.
Relational contract theory will first be presented using principles
gleaned from writings in the field 7 to craft a functional/relational model
with which to approach legal practice.8 This version of relational con-
tract will then be applied to the problem of developing country debt
through description of a hypothetical sovereign loan relationship.9 By
exploring the conflicts and trends of this association under a general
"taxonomy of relational contract," normative analysis of the restructur-
ing process can be accomplished, contractual trends identified, and sug-
gestions for change offered.'
II. RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
The fundamental insight of relational contract theory is that most
private exchange occurs within ongoing relationships between parties, n
rather than the discrete transactional environment 2 assumed in classical
eign loan agreements, and is thus an expansion upon Gottlieb's brief and more general treatment of
debt. See id. at 569-73. The Comment will more fully describe the sovereign loan issue in relational
contract terms, and will offer a practical analysis of legal practice in the field based on theory. The
reassessment which this Comment undertakes is justified by the many changes which have occurred
in the field since 1983, when Gottlieb's article appeared. These factors include continued iliquidity
of the borrowers, the failure of a "debtor's cartel" to become a serious actor on the international
scene, the growth of a secondary market for sovereign debt, the establishment of reserves and the
taking write-offs of developing country debt by banks, and the innovative restructuring terms seen in
the Mexican, and other, restructurings.
5 See generally Hope & Klein, Issues in External Debt Management, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
BORROWING: NEGOTIATION AND RENEGOTIATION 4.A (D. Bradlow & W. Jourdin rev. eds.
1984)[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL BORROWING].
6 See generally SOVEREIGN BORROWERS: GUIDELINES ON LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH COM-
MERCIAL LENDERS (L. Kalderefi & Q. Siddiqi eds. 1984)[hereinafter SOVEREIGN BORROWERS].
7 For a survey of relational contract thinking, see Macneil, Relational Contract" What We Do
and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483 [hereinafter Relational Contract].
8 See infra notes 11-46 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 47-101 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 102-67 and accompanying text. The basic form for this analysis was suggested
in Joerges, Relational Contract Theory in a Comparative Perspective: Tensions Between Contract and
Antitrust Law Principles in the Assessment of Contract Relations Between Automobile Manufacturers
and Their Dealers in Germany, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 581, 603.
11 Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 856-57 (197S)[hereinafter Adjustment of Relations].
12 "A truly discrete exchange transaction would be entirely separate not only from all other
present relations but from all past and future relations as well." Id. at 856. "Discreteness is lost even
Sovereign Debt
8:727(1988)
and neoclassical contractual theory. 3 "[R]elational contracts emerge in
in the simple promise situation, because a basis for trust must exist if the promise is to be of any
value." Id. at 858. Thus, few if any exchanges are isolated transactions, free from relational princi-
ples.
An example of a relatively discrete transaction is buying gas on an interstate highway. Id. at
857. An example of a highly relational contract is marriage or a franchise agreement, where the
parties are bound by mutual interests created through their long-term association.
13 Different degrees of discreteness (i.e., levels of interaction of the parties outside the contrac-
tual exchange) are assumed in different theories of contract law. These conceptions differ due to the
legal and social complexity of a particular society. The rejection of the discretely based contract
systems (classical and neoclassical theory) by relational contract theory is a radical departure from
the doctrine found in most law schools and treatises. See Macaulay, supra note 4; Gordon, Macau-
lay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565.
The differences in the three distinct contractual doctrines-classical, neoclassical, and relational
theories-exist on a continuum best illustrated as they developed in United States law:
Classical contract law refers (in American terms) to that developed in the 19th century and
brought to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston in The Law of Contracts and in the Restatement of
Contracts. Neoclassical contract law refers to a body of contract law founded on that system in
overall structure but considerably modified in some, although by no means all, of its detail. The
latter is epitomized by the U.C.C. Art. 2 (1972), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
(1981).
Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 855 n.2 (citations omitted). For a more devel-
oped comment on the doctrinal development of contract law, see E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUD-
iES OF CONTRACr LAW 84-91 (3d ed. 1984).
The structure and strict formality of classical contract law encourages discrete transactions in
order to preserve the parties' autonomy outside the contract and provide explicit details for planning
by the parties. Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 859-61. Flexibility within the
contract is sacrificed to the planning aspect of contract through "presentiation" of future contingen-
cies within the formal contract. Id. See also Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presen-
tiation, 60 VA. L. REv. 589 (1974). Law based on classical doctrine does this by ignoring the
identity of the parties, limiting interpretation of the agreement to the "four corners" of the contract,
and drawing clear and explicit rules of interpretation for those contracts. See Macneil, Adjustment
of Relations, supra note 11, at 863-64. Under a classical system, "contract litigation is a primary
means of deterring breach and directly and indirectly resolving disputes. Without contract law and
the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force, performance of contracts would be highly uncer-
tain." Macaulay, supra note 4, at 467. Flexibility in commercial relations is provided for by the
marketplace to which the subjects of classical law have easy access outside the distinct terms of the
contract. Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 859-60.
The doctrinal shift from classical to neo-classical contractual theory better accounts for the
interests of parties engaged in long-term contractual relations. Those interests include the need to
create flexibility and standards in an agreement with explicit terms which may not adequately ad-
dress future problems. Id. at 865. Neoclassical techniques such as third-party standards, cost-of-
service clauses, and other gap-filling provisions allow the parties to interpret legal duties during
contractual performance through use of objective standards and principled behavior. Another devel-
opment of neoclassical doctrine is the interpretation of contracts to reflect the fairness which should
hold between the parties in the form of mutuality, materiality, and good faith requirements. Id. at
880-83.
Though neoclassical systems are more efficient than classical doctrine in addressing the needs of
ongoing exchange, parties still suffer from the inherent discreteness which the classical structure
forces upon the contracting parties. Id. at 866-73. Explicit planning of the parties still governs the
transaction unless subsequent agreement allows a different interpretation of the contract. Id. at 873-
80.
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the context of ongoing relationships."' 4 In relational contracts, discrete
practices, like breach and litigation, have been replaced by adjustment
within social and political processes largely separate from the positive
legal institutions of the state. 5 The conduct of relational contracts only
roughly corresponds to the legal doctrine taught in United States law
schools. Instead,
[t]he source of juridical norms in a relational order is to be found in agree-
ments, arrangements, and other patterns of interaction between the parties.
The pronouncements of the courts of the State and the laws of the other
branches of governments may purport to govern a relational order formally
subject to the State, but they are not sources of law in such relationships;
they are external to them.' 6
While the foundations of this "internal law" in long-term relations
are the contracts drafted between the parties, the internal rules of rela-
tional contracts often ignore or modify the technical terms of the formal
contract. Despite the potential for irrelevance, written contracts may act
"as constitutions establishing legislative and administrative processes for
the relation,"' 7 with the actual relationship between the parties forming
around the rights and purposes expressed in the document. In analyzing
such contractual exchanges, the "relational approach focuses on time-
on the temporal dimension of relationships. Emphasis on discrete trans-
actions abstracted from the ongoing relationships in which they occur
distorts the character of the transactions and of the relationships them-
selves."' 8 Lawyers confronting relational contracts should examine how
14 Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. RFv. 545, 546.
15 Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 901. Examples of relational contract
range from two businesspersons with a long-standing relationship (prone to ignore the forms and
contracts which probably comprise the legal substance of their relationship), to commodities and
stock exchanges, where bids and buys are probably not legally enforceable in court (since they are
largely unwritten, and thus would fall outside the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds, U.C.C. § 2-201), but
where few breaches of "contracts" ever occur.
16 Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 595. Litigation is largely irrelevant in relational contracts:
The dominant aspect of juridical activities in relational societies is not of a litigious character.
It centers instead on the practices of actors and on their usages, customs, and interpretations
that mediate between actors' actual patterns of conduct and the formal juridical instruments
that are deemed to govern them. It focuses also on the negotiation and renegotiation of juridi-
cal instruments accepted as binding.
Id. at 568.
17 Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 894. There are three justifications for
exploring the relational aspect of contract:
First, one might regard relational transactions as giving rise to obligations different from those
(promissory) ones that arise in discrete transactions. Second, one might argue that, though the
law must promote the same policies in relational and discrete transactions, the actual rules
adopted must differ to meet the differing social realities. Third, one could maintain that rela-
tional contracts give rise to a different set of policies to be promoted than do discrete
transactions.
Kornhauser, The Resurrection of Contract (Book Review), 82 COLUM. L. REv. 184, 190 (1982).




the actual behavior of the parties has deviated from the formal rules of
the written contract.
Given the distortion of conventional thinking19 when applied to re-
lational contracts, adjudication of relational contract disputes is prob-
lematic.20 Moreover, description of relational contracts in conventional
terms is inadequate.21 It is this relational gap-this "discontinuity be-
tween doctrine and law-in-action" 22 ---which constitutes the major legal
challenge relationists pose to conventional contract practice.
Two possible normative insights occur to the lawyer when this rela-
tional dilemma is posed: 1) that clients should act with the recognition
that ongoing relations cannot fully be governed by conventional contract
law (the behavioral norm);23 and 2) that reform of legal theory is neces-
sary for effective drafting of relational contracts (the legal norm).2 4
Thus, both conventional practice and theory should be critically ana-
lyzed when approaching relational contracts.
This Comment suggests that this relational dilemma exists in sover-
eign loan agreements. 25 The resolution of this dilemma reqtiires a combi-
nation of behavioral and legal changes which should lead to a revised
model for the drafting of sovereign loan agreements in the future. A
conceptual framework is provided which explains recent trends in sover-
eign debt management. While detailed suggestions for change cannot be
provided by this Comment, trends and principles will be set forth on
which legal approaches to drafting loan contracts can be based.
A. A Functional Model of Relational Contract
A functional model of relational contract must assess the proce-
19 Classical and neoclassical contract law systems are labelled "conventional" throughout this
Comment.
20 See ALCOA v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980)(where a court reformed a
20-year aluminum conversion contract based on mutual mistake of the parties in basing the price of
services and aluminum on an index which did not include fuel prices, which skyrocketed in 1973);
see also Goldberg, Price Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 527, 534-40 (criti-
cizing the ALCOA decision because of its failure to consider opportunity costs in determinations
and the court's seeming ignorance of the purpose of long-term contracts).
21 The concept of a legal system centered on the State and its officials cannot account for the
juridical system of relational societies. The circumstances under which a juridical system can
be said to arise in a relational society must be identified in terms other than those of the legal
system of the State.
Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 569.
22 Gordon, supra note 13, at 576.
23 See Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 7, at 485-90.
24 See id. at 491-93.
25 Proof that relational theory applies to the problems of sovereign debt is provided infra notes
41-45 and accompanying text. See also Gottlieb, supra note 4, passim.
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dures, institutions, and practices which bridge the gap between informal
behavior and the formal contract. Since a focus on legal rules and formal
contract interpretation is inappropriate in relational contracts, 26 the
functional model should suggest behavioral and legal modifications nec-
essary to govern an ongoing relationship between contracting parties
effectively.
The invocation of formal terms by parties during the conduct of the
relation is the most obvious occasion for conflict between the formal and
relational contract. Consequently, the legitimacy of the formal contract
is the first step in a functional inquiry into an ongoing relation.27 Ongo-
ing exchange relations depend primarily on the good will of the parties
for their conduct. As a result, the formal contract is often ignored in the
parties' practice.2" The major danger of this tendency to ignore the con-
tract is that principles and terms in the formal contract may intervene in
the real conduct of the relation and harm the interests of the parties or
others external to the relation (third parties or the state). Formal con-
tract principles "long decayed and made obsolete by less formally estab-
lished patterns of communications and behavior" may be resurrected to
the detriment of the relation.29
Delegitimization of the formal contract through the parties' infor-
mal behavior may also harm interests embedded in the formal contract.
These harms are demonstrated by referring to the internal, external, and
relational aspects of rule in a contractual association.3 ° Internally, each
26 See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
27 Legitimacy of a particular contract rests upon the respect given it by the parties and the state:
the formal contract (the state's legal recognition of the horizontal commercial relationship) "governs
a relationship to the extent that the parties are willing to adopt the law of the state as a rule of
conduct or to the extent that the state is able and willing to enforce its law." Gottlieb, supra note 4,
at 601.
28 "In the words of a businessman, 'You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if
you ever want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business
because one must behave decently.'" Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 61 (1963).
29 Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 894.
30 Recognition that the positive law of the state is not the only force behind legal rule has long
been an accepted tenet of legal theory as well as a cornerstone of relationism. See Gottlieb, supra
note 4, at 602. In addition to this "external" aspect of law attributable to the state or community
outside of the contract is the "internal" force arising from an individual's self-interest, morality, and
psychology. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85-86 (1961). In addition, in a rela-
tional contract a rule's vitality exists due to neither internal nor external interests, but relational:
"there is also an awareness that a breach of certain patterns of behavior may be interpreted by
another party as indicating a change in the relationship." Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 574. Thus,
parties to a relational contract consider not only external and internal rules in performance, but also
reactions of the other contracting parties, which will translate into additional obligations based on
each person's perceptions of others' actions and interests.
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party holds interests in the formal contract regardless of whether litiga-
tion is ever foreseen or intended.31 The major internal interests are those
which are protected by the formalized obligations of the contract. This
formalization is a choice by the parties to enter into a legally binding
agreement, rather than an open-ended or informal one, with the addi-
tional assurances which the formal legal system provides to its subjects.32
Practices which undermine the contract's formal obligations may dis-
count the internal interests protected by these terms, and may also dis-
count the compulsion each party feels towards the relation overall. This
may cause "considerable uncertainty and ambiguity" regarding the "ex-
tent of the binding obligations of the parties."33 As a result: 1) the reme-
dies available under the formal contract to protect these interests may
seem coercive to one of the parties; 2) the remedies available under the
contract may be ineffective; or 3) the interests of the parties themselves
will be harmed.
On the relational level, as the formal contract is delegitimized, ad
hoc procedures develop which may lead to conflicting interpretations and
breakdown of the reciprocity needed for an effective relation.34 In addi-
tion, negotiation or evolution of the informal rules may lead to adver-
sarial stances between the parties which harm the relation through a
breakdown of the reciprocity originally formalized in the contract. The
informal rules which develop may also be ineffective in promoting the
parties' interests, since no recourse to the formal contract will be possible
to enforce such rules.
Finally, external interests of third parties or the state in the formal
terms of the contract must be considered in the context of formal con-
tract legitimacy. There are two levels of such external interests. The first
is society's interest in general formal contract principles, which are un-
dermined to the extent the parties ignore the formal contract during per-
formance. Examples of this interest include principles of mutuality and
unconscionability, which are enforced by the courts only after the parties
request intervention through litigation."
Specific external interests may also be harmed, however, when
31 This interest is promoted only to the extent a party perceives its interest is represented by the
contract.
32 See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 583-85.
33 Id. at 607.
34 "If one party acquiesces to the practice of another's interpretation... patterns of expectation
develop and the new performance will comprise part of the "price" of the contract for future opera-
tion of the relation." Goldberg, supra note 20, at 532.
35 It is interesting to note that this interest is primarily an aid to contracting parties, and has
only an indirect benefit to society as a whole. For example, the rule against unconscionable con-
tracts will act primarily to protect a particular contracting party, but its enforcement throughout
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"[t]he rights and interests of third parties [are] adversely affected by a
course of dealing between parties to an ongoing relationship."36 This
would occur where specific legislation exists which restricts or regulates a
particular type of contractual relationship.37 Legislation or similar coer-
cive action 38 may not be effective in enforcing the policy when the formal
contract is undermined by informal action. Thus, the government policy
will be harmed. Finally, external actors may be able to protect their in-
terests through litigation 39 or social pressure apart from the mechanisms
of government.
The dangers of illegitimacy of the formal contract promoted by in-
formal behavior leads to the primary principle of a functional model of
relational contract: the formal contract should not be undermined by the
parties' practice unnecessarily. Where the legitimacy is undermined, an
inquiry into the actual harms must be undertaken to gauge whether for-
mal modification to conform the contract to practice might be more ef-
fective in controlling the contract. Even if the danger from erosion of the
formal contract's legitimacy is marginal, however, the relation must still
be conducted in a "relationally effective" manner4° in order to be consid-
society reflects society's choice to prevent such contracts because they are regarded as harmful to
society as a whole.
36 Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 607.
37 For instance, state and federal corporate law regulates the corporation's business activity in
the United States, which is, after all, only a complex organism constructed of a myriad of contrac-
tual exchanges within its corporate structure. When derogations from the basic documents of the
corporation occur, more likely than not legislated interests of the state or nation will also be harmed.
38 See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 609.
39 As third party beneficiaries or creditors, perhaps, or as plaintiffs under legislation allowing
parties to act as "private attorneys general."
40 An ideal relation allows behavior and law to interact in a matter consistent with the twin
norms of relational exchange-preservation of the relation and harmonization of conflicting interests
within the association. Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 886. Application of the
second functional inquiry asks whether such preservation and harmonization is occurring equitably
and efficiently. See Whitford, supra note 14, at 550-51. This is in contrast to the approach of neo-
classical contract, which asks only whether one party is better off and no party is worse off. Com-
pare Posner, Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOESTRA L. REV. 487 (1980)(advancing a wealth-maximizing view of ethics and the law) with Mac-
neil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classifica-
tory Apparatus", 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1981)(critiquing the neoclassical economist's view of
contract and proposing more detailed contractual principles)[hereinafter Rich Classificatory Appara-
tus].
The "effectiveness" of relational orders was first referred to by Gottlieb in terms largely con-
cerned with how rules restricted parties' freedom within the relation. Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 569-
74. His examination of relationism's power to rule, therefore, is really more a study of the efficacy of
relational rules than of the effectiveness of the relation itself. Relational effectiveness in this Com-
ment has a more normative character, and primarily questions whether the relational level functions
as a fair and cost-beneficial method of exchange between the parties within an exchange relation
capable of continuing towards a mutual objective. Should the relation proceed without considering
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ered a proper contractual relation. Thus, once the functional inquiry
into formal legitimacy has ended, the model should focus upon the effec-
tiveness of the informal behavior in the relation. From a drafting stand-
point, a contract with good "relational fit" promotes effective adjustment
to change in the relation, yet remains honest to the interests in the formal
contract.
B. Preface to Application of the Model
The overriding fact of sovereign lending in the modem world is that
the well-being of international banking is now tied to the domestic econo-
mies of developing country debtors through an interdependent world
economy. 4' It is this realization which makes the sovereign loan restruc-
turing one of the grandest relational exchanges in the contract universe.
Within the current restructuring regime, the adjustments between the
sovereign and its creditors affect deep internal interests of the parties (fi-
nancial interests of the creditors and national interests of the sovereign),
as well as external interests of the international political economy.42 Be-
cause "no agreement captures the full texture of [such a] relationship, 43
serious questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the contract
arise.
Armed with a basic conception of a functional/relational contract,
the model will be applied to a generic sovereign loan agreement to judge
whether the written contract properly performs the purposes of contract:
1) fostering reciprocity through exchange; and 2) effectuating planning
and performance.' Exchange and reciprocity compose the social and
economic bases for contract; planning and performance are the mechani-
cal foundations. Application of the functional/relational theory to the
contract's substantive and procedural components will demonstrate how
the actions of the parties in the "dirty" behavioral world4 of restructur-
ing recognize the nature of the exchange as "relational" in conduct while
many of the legal norms of relational contract are ignored in conven-
questions of equity, there is little chance horizontal relations can continue when one party is subject
to what it perceives as unfair duties of performance. The interest in efficiency is obvious, considering
the nature of commercial exchange as a vehicle of mutual profit.
41 Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 570-73.
42 For a sophisticated taxonomy of external interests in contract, see Macneil, Values in Con-
tract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 340, 367-82 (1983)[hereinafter Values].
43 Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 190.
44 These objectives are distilled from I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
AND RELATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1-57 (2d ed. 1978)[hereinafter CASEBOOK]; Macneil, Ad-
justment of Relations, supra note 11, at 862.
45 Macaulay, supra note 4, at 577-80.
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tional drafting and adversarial negotiation.46
III. A HYPOTHETICAL SOVEREIGN LOAN RELATION
To apply the functional model to sovereign debt instructively, a hy-
pothetical transaction involving a debtor, creditors, and a loan agreement
will be presented.47 The debtor for this example48 ("Debtor") is a me-
dium-size developing country49 with substantial debt secured by govern-
ment guarantee and held by a syndicate of developing country banks.5"
Debtor's loans were previously restructured after default upon its initial
set of obligations: interest and principal payments were rescheduled and
a package of "new money" extended by creditor banks to quell the tem-
porary illiquidity which threatened default.51
Debtor's political situation is a volatile one. The government is de-
pendent upon economic concessions gained from creditors in restructur-
ing and the fortunes of the world economy to meet the social and
economic demands of its citizenry.52 Payment of the external debt is
46 For example, while the terms of default within the sovereign loan agreement appear relatively
strict and discrete, see infra note 66, the reality of restructuring demands that the sovereign and its
creditors negotiate with each other through an indeterminate cycle of default and rescheduling.
47 This hypothetical debt relationship strives for a minimum level of description in order to have
general applicability to all sovereign loans.
48 Represented by its Ministry of Finance in negotiations and performance. See Heckart, The
Process of Rescheduling Sovereign Debt to Bank Creditors, in 2 INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, supra
note 5, at 7.1A.1, 7.
49 Debtor has a total of $20 billion in debt to international banks, placing it near the middle of
the spectrum of troubled debtors. As of June 1987, Mexico and Brazil each owed around $75 billion
to private banks, Argentina $30 billion, Venezuela $26 billion, and the Philippines $14 billion. Wall
St. J., July 2, 1987.
50 On the distinction between public (sovereign) and private sector debt, one author has written:
Restructuring private sector debt has generally been a separate and distinct exercise from re-
structuring sovereign or public sector debt. One basic is the legal framework. The restructure
of private sector debt is ultimately subject to the supervision of a bankruptcy or reorganization
court in one or more countries, in the absence of contractual agreement between debtor and
creditors. However, there are no bankruptcy or reorganization laws clearly applicable to sover-
eign or public sector debt, and restructure of public sector debt occurs outside the courtroom
and only when debtor and creditors record their mutual agreement by contract. Nevertheless,
the basic question is always the same: who pays, lends or defers payment of how much, when
and at what price?
Mudge, Restructuring Private & Public Sector Debt, 20 INT'L LAW. 847, 848 (1986).
51 The debt crisis has traditionally been thought of in terms of trans-border transfer risk (lack of
foreign currency to pay foreign-denominated obligations) as opposed to solvency risk (lack of eco-
nomic capability to satisfy external obligations). See, e.g., W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra
note 3, at 45; but see D. LOMAX, supra note 3, at 62 (arguing that insolvency of a sovereign might be
possible). See generally Walter, Country Risk and International Bank Lending, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 71, 80-83.
52 This is particularly true in Latin America where the most grievous debt exists and where
democracy has shown the most growth. See, eg., Brazil's Debts Now Carry a Political Price for
President, N. Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 5 (Week in Review), at 3, col. 4. See generally Bloch,
Society and Business after the Great Reschedulings: A Futuristic Essay, 38 J. INT'L AFF. 91 (1984);
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financed by export earnings from Debtor's domestically produced goods,
which compete with other nations' wares on the international market. In
addition, world interest rates dictate at what rate the loans must be paid
back, adding or subtracting millions to the flexible payments when those
rates fluctuate.5 3 Thus, when Debtor bargains within a restructuring, it
is projecting into the future of an unpredictable world economy on which
it is dependent, as are its creditors.
The banks holding Debtor's restructured loans are large, medium,
and small banks54 bound together by a variety of contractual, political,
and economic bonds.5 Any action modifying the loan agreement, de-
claring default, waiving acceleration, or restructuring the debt comes
only after "democratic" deliberations by all the creditors through the
vehicle of the creditor committee.5 6 Also included in the restructuring
are secondary holders of debt who have purchased an original creditor's
debt at a discounted rate, reflecting the decreased value of restructured
loans. 7 In the event of default and acceleration of the loan, recovery by
individual banks is pro rata on the basis of exposure in the syndicated
Walter, supra note 51, at 79. Indeed, as loan restructurings have required fiscal austerity from devel-
oping country debtors under International Monetary Fund ("IMF") conditionality, the political cli-
mate has often given default a popular appeal. See Brazilian Debt Crisis Flares Again, N. Y. Times,
Feb. 16, 1987, at 19, col. 3 (nat'l ed.); Mexico Signals it Wants Debt Concessions, Wall St. J., Oct. 6,
1986, at 21, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); Peru Defiant After IMFActs to Deny New Credit, Fin. Times, Aug. 18,
1986, at 1, col. 3 (int'l ed.); see also Bloch, supra, at 93-95 (discussing socio-economic future of
debtor nations); Debt Crisis Is Inflicting a Heavy Human Toll in Dominican Republic, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (describing the poverty and tragedy which comes with large sovereign
loans and mismanagement of funds).
53 On Debtor's debt of $25 billion, for example, a rise in the London interbank offered rate
("LIBOR")(a base interest rate for many sovereign loans) of even five basis points will add $200
million to its annual interest payments.
54 For the purposes of this hypothetical, all creditor banks are United States institutions.
55 See generally Semkow, Syndicating and Rescheduling International Financial Transactions: A
Survey of the Legal Issues Encountered by Commercial Banks, 18 INT'L LAW. 869 (1984). The
political and economic bonds are those implicit in the United States regulatory system and economy.
See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text. The contractual bonds take the form of loan syndica-
tion, a common practice in modem international banking.
56 This requires a majority of the lenders' vote, calculated on amount of participation in the debt.
Wood, Selected Aspects of International Loan Documentation and Rescheduling, in SOVEREIGN BOR-
ROWERS, supra note 6, at 123, 129. Sometimes one bank holds enough debt of a particular country
to dominate the loan's restructuring. See, e.g., Talks on Philippine Debt Collapse, N.Y. Times, Nov.
8, 1986, at 17, col. 3 (nat'l ed.)("Every time a vote wks taken or an issue brought to the table, one
institution reserved their [sic] position or objected .... " It was rumored that Citibank, holding half
of $3.6 billion being renegotiated, was the holdout.).
57 These secondary holders are subject to the same obligations as original lenders. Unfortu-
nately, as a practical matter the secondary holders are difficult to track down. See Worries Deepen
Again on Third World Debt As Brazil Stops Paying, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (banks
fruitlessly searched for the secondary holder of Republic Bank's debt after Republic refused to com-
mit new funds, arguing its original exposure was no longer relevant)[hereinafter Worries Deepen].
These secondary holders tend to be banks with exposure in other debtor nations seeking to diversify
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loan.58
The loan agreement is the legal document purporting to rule the
debt relation between Debtor and its creditors. 9 After restructuring, the
financial terms of the loan are rescheduled, with interest and principal
payments spread out over a longer period than in the original loan.'
Interest is set at a slight premium above the previous rate to reflect the
involuntary nature of this new loan.61
The agreement's legal terms are the first object of the functional-
relational approach to sovereign debt.62 Such technical terms are left for
lawyers to draft after the financial issues-such as interest and duration
of the loan-have been settled between Debtor and its creditors.63 There
are two types of legal terms. Operational clauses dictate payment proce-
dure, conditions precedent to drawdown, and other mechanical aspects
of the loan.' These procedural aspects of the loan contract will affect
the nature of the restructuring process when default threatens, as well as
how efficiently the loan is managed before illiquidity strikes.65
Protective clauses assure the lenders a secure borrower.66 These
or consolidate their international debt portfolios through swap or purchase. See INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Feb. 1986, at 17.
58 Wood, supra note 56, at 134. Despite domination by larger creditors, action by the syndicate
during restructuring takes on a highly representative character, including selection of the lead bank
and steering committee based on relative levels of exposure and geographical balance. Id. at 129-30.
59 For a sample loan agreement between a sovereign and a syndicate of commercial banks, see
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Annotated Sample Loan Agreement [hereinafter Sample Loan],
in 2 INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, supra note 5, at 5.2C.1. See generally Kaderefi, Negotiating
Strategies and the Role of the Lawyer, in SOVEREIGN BORROWERS, supra note 6, at 26.
60 Financial terms are typically rescheduled using the "short-leash" approach. Such a strategy
reschedules only a proportion of the payments in arrears plus payments falling due over the six to
eighteen months following a cut-off date. Wood, supra note 56, at 135.
61 See Siddiqi, Some Critical Issues in Negotiations and Legal Drafting, in SOVEREIGN BORROW-
ERS, supra note 6, at 44, 61. The use of such a penalty is not universal-creditors have begun to
concede the penal nature of the interest premium is inappropriate in an extended restructuring rela-
tionship. See Mexico Lenders Agree to Join Rescue Package, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 31, col. I
(nat'l ed.).
62 While the sheer volume and long maturity of the loan initially make relational contract theory
applicable to sovereign debt due to the ongoing nature of the relation, the legal aspect determines
how relationally functional the loan contract is. See supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
63 See Siddiqi, supra note 61, at 45-46.
64 See id. at 48, 52.
65 See infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
66 See Sample Loan, supra note 59, §§ 8-11 (examples of typical protective clauses). See gener-
ally Siddiqi, supra note 61, at 55-66. Protective clauses include: the borrower's representations and
warranties; covenants or undertakings; events of default; and terms governing changed circum-
stances. A period to cure a violation of these terms is included in the contract.
Representations and warranties of the borrower assure the lender that: documentation conveyed
is accurate, the proper governmental and private authority has approved the loan, no legal encum-
brances exist which subordinate claims of the lender to other persons (the pari passu clause); and
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legal clauses get their strength from the remedies for default, allowing
acceleration of the loan and set-off of debts against certain assets in the
event that a "material" provision in the loan agreement is violated.67 In
principle, interest rates decrease as loan terms become stricter. This low-
ering of the interest rate reflects the increased security which restrictions
on freedom of the sovereign represents, and the decreased risk to the
creditor that an unforeseen default will occur.68
A. The Restructuring Process
The original loans to various public and private entities in Debtor
were extended during a glut of petro-dollar deposits and inflated interest
rates which encouraged bank lending in hopes of large profits and pres-
other facts which existed at the time of agreement have not materially changed to prejudice the
loan's execution. See Sample Loan, supra note 59, § 9; see also Venkatachari, The Eurocurrency
Loan: Role and Content of the Contract, in SOVEREIGN BORROWERS, supra note 6, at 73, 86-91.
The sovereign's covenants to the lender bind it to: keep the loan consistent with governmental
regulations of the borrower's jurisdiction; update documentation of the loan throughout perform-
ance; allow inspection; give prompt notice of default; allow no prior claims to that of the lender upon
security (the negative pledge); and fulfill other pledges which formally maintain the lender's interest
in a secure loan and borrower. Sample Loan, supra note 59, § 10. See also Venkatachari, supra, at
91-94.
Events of default under the loan are conditions which will allow acceleration by the borrower of
the remaining payments at will. These include: failure to make a payment; failure to perform a
covenant; default on a substantial obligation to another borrower (cross-default); a materially ad-
verse court action; and various others. Sample Loan, supra note 59, § 11. See also Venkatachari,
supra, at 95-99.
Changed circumstances enumerate who bears the risk when legal or financial facts surrounding
the loan add costs to or otherwise affect successful performance. See Venkatachari, supra at 99-100.
67 See generally Youard, Events of Default, in SOVEREIGN BORROWER, supra note 6, at 176.
The representations, covenants, and events of default in the loan contract are examples of presentia-
tion. "Presentiation is a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the effect of the future
on the present. ... [The presentiation of a transaction involves restricting its expected future effects
to those defined in the present, i.e., at the inception of the transaction." Macneil, Adjustment of
Relations, supra note 11, at 863 [footnotes omitted]. Lopked at this way, the protective clauses of the
loan agreement are presentiated versions of what might go wrong in the loan relation and thus serve
a planning and communication role, aside from their obvious purpose as protectors. Unfortunately,
the discrete mindset of drafters makes presentiation little more than a worst-case scenario, with little
real effect.
68 Siddiqi, supra note 61, at 61. One additional class of clauses are litigation clauses: the choice
of law, choice of forum, and waiver of sovereign immunity which are standard terms in sovereign
loan contracts. Eg., Sample Loan, supra note 59, § 15. See generally Venkatachari, supra note 66,
at 101-05.
Almost all sovereign loan agreements have stipulated adjudication in New York or London,
with New York or English law controlling. This is due to the growing sophistication and specializa-
tion of those financial centers as well as the unacceptability of a developing country forum to credi-
tor banks lending to developing country sovereigns. See Semkow, supra note 55, at 903-911. United
States law is used for this hypothetical.
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tige.6 9 The process of restructuring on a country-by-country basis (ad
hoc restructuring70 ) strengthened mutual interests between Debtor and
its lenders over time as various private and public loans were consoli-
dated71 into a huge "involuntary" loan guaranteed by the sovereign.
72
This original consolidated loan has been rescheduled at least once by
Debtor and its creditors.
Restructuring begins when large-scale defaults are threatened
throughout Debtor, and loans are consolidated through documentation
and exchange among the creditors in preparation for negotiation. 73 Both
public and private external debts are unified under the guarantees and
assumptions of the sovereign during this stage.74  Flexibility lost to the
sovereign by consolidating debt does not outweigh the advantages of hav-
ing one body of negotiators responsive to the problems of the sovereign.75
69 See generally A. SAMPSON, supra note 1, ch. 2. Compare W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEET,
supra note 3, at 13-31 with Eskridge, supra note 3, at 287-306.
70 Ad hoc restructuring remains the most prevalent procedure for the workout of problem sover-
eign loans. Any attempt at relational analysis must work through this vehicle. See Sargen, Managed
Lending: An Assessment of the Current Strategy Toward LDC Debt, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
533 (1985). Unfortunately such individual treatment promotes "crisis myopia," which directs the
banks' and sovereign's attention to solving the short-term liquidity problem, rather than its long-
term structural causes. See W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 73-78. There are
other advantages of ad hoc restructuring which make it the preferred vehicle for long-term debt
management: the ad hoc approach prevented (and prevents) the formation of a "debtors' cartel" by
isolating developing countries in their own financial problems and allowing separate but unequal
treatment by lenders. "[B]y the end of 1984 ... there was no longer a global debt crisis but a series
of different debt situations." D. LOMAX, supra note 3, at 150. This differentiation has widened with
the rise of secondary markets for sovereign debt. See supra note 57.
Ad hoc adjustment (rather than an international or regional approach) also instills greater con-
fidence in the world capital markets, since failure of a particular restructuring or reform can be
isolated to that particular country's debt. This is a luxury international proposals do not have by
nature of their scope. Cf. F. BERGSTEN, W. CLINE & J. WILLIAMSON, BANK LENDING TO DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES: THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES 93-199 (1985)(summarizing proposals for interna-
tional debt relief).
71 See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. See generally Mudge, supra note 50.
72 See Semkow, supra note 55, at 875-84. The loan is involuntary because the lender has no
choice but to refinance the credit in hopes funds will be available in the future to pay off the debt.
Without ample cash reserves to absorb the blow of non-performing status, see infra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text, no lender can afford not to provide a loan to help pay the huge interest
payments.
73 See W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 73-78.
74 "[L]inkage between private sector debt and public sector debt is [one way of] combining both
for the purpose of the new money request by the country, frequently with the endorsement of the
International Monetary Fund and bank regulators." Mudge, supra note 50, at 851. Another tech-
nique is assumption or guaranty of old private debt by the sovereign through a governmental arm or
subsidiary corporation. Id. A third method is "onlending" of funds, where a loan is extended to a
public sector entity with the contractual understanding that a third-party private sector borrower
will receive the proceeds of the loan in domestic currency. Id. at 854.
75 Consolidation assures the creditors that their loans will be treated on an equal footing and
allows them to focus on the problem of satisfying all debt, thus avoiding a "race" among the credi-
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Unifying debt also allows peer pressure among banks to keep smaller
creditors in a renegotiating posture when default by individual obligees in
Debtor threatens; costly litigation and attachment of sovereign assets in
an unsure legal environment are thus avoided. 76 There are disadvantages
to consolidation, however, since it allows the terms of a new loan to be
tied to overall performance of the national economy, 77 and makes Debtor
directly answerable for all citizens and subjects whose debt has been
consolidated.
The most painful aspect of restructuring for the creditors is the
"new money" obligation of each bank proportional to its original expo-
sure in Debtor.7 8 Force for this obligation comes internally (from other
creditors), relationally (through the threat of default from Debtor), and
externally (through the United States regulatory system). The new
money is used to preserve bank profits through refinancing of interest
payments in arrears, 79 and to spark economic growth in the debtor na-
tion.80 After the terms of the restructuring are settled, it is then offered
tors for attachment which would occur in absence of consolidation. See generally Clark, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring" Parity of Treatment Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to Comparable
Debts, 20 INT'L LAW. 857 (1986). The advisory committee can then conveniently negotiate a re-
structuring agreement with the sovereign, which guarantees all or most of the country's external
debt. This policy flexibility is crucial considering the national and international problems which
brought on the liquidity crisis.
76 Another aspect of this debt consolidation is coercion of the sovereign short of accelerating the
whole debt. The presence of smaller creditors preserves the potential threat of "renegade" legal
actions upon smaller pieces of external debt which are held by the relatively less exposed creditor
banks. Cf. Brown, How to be Paid on a Defaulting Loan, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Apr. 1983, at 10. Suit
by any creditor triggers the cross-default clause and allows set-off of assets of the sovereign to facili-
tate judgment.
77 With IMF conditionality being incorporated into the contract, the sovereign is often faced
with austerity imposed at the hands of its commercial creditors. This severely limits the sovereign's
freedom-of-action and autonomy, and suggests a legal argument based upon the public international
law doctrine of odious debt. Compare Frankenberg & Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebted-
ness of Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT'L J. SOC.
L. 415 (1984) with Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the Interna-
tional Law of Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 39. Cf Sudan's
Leader Says Nation Won't Pay All Foreign Debt, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at AI0, col. 3 (blaming
foreign debt on predecessor's "unconstitutional regime"). See generally supra note 65.
78 Semkow, supra note 55, at 893-94. In recent restructurings, the new money obligations have
led many banks to refuse to join negotiated packages. See W. CLINE, MOBILIZING BANK LENDING
TO DEBTOR COUNTRIEs 5-6 (1987)(stating that, according to the Mexican government, 139 banks
out of a possible 494 failed to sign on to Mexico's September 1986 restructuring package)[hereinafter
MOBILIZING].
79 See W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 74-78.
80 This aspect of new money is doubly important in the wake of the Baker Plan, a policy initiated
by Secretary of the Treasury James Baker to deal with developing country debt. See Baker Debt
Plan Is Alive, but Is It Well?, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1986, at 22, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). The Baker Plan's
focus is on coordinated economic development, aided by injections of new capital from international
sources to power the developing country out of the debt crisis. The establishment of large-scale
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:727(1988)
to and accepted by creditor banks."1 Significant resources and coercion
within and without the relation are wielded before the restructuring
agreement is agreed to, however. It is clear that recent write-offs and
reserve additions by creditor banks in the United States have increased
the possibility that restructurings may not be as widely subscribed to as
in the past.
B. The Regulatory System
The primary external force in the sovereign loan relation is the fed-
eral regulatory system, 2 which undercuts formal contract law 3 and in-
tervenes in the informal system of sovereign debt restructuring in two
ways. The more apparent manner is through the accounting, reporting,
and reserve requirements of the banking laws in general and the Interna-
tional Lending Supervision Act of 198384 ("ILSA" or "Act") in particu-
reserves by major creditor banks has been interpreted by some to ring the death knell for the Baker
Plan. See Death of 'Baker Plan' on Debt Seen, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at Dl, col. 3 ($3 billion
reserve established by Citicorp is the "coup de grace" for the floundering Baker Plan). But see
Citicorp's Reed Outlines Path on Third World Loans, Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at 6, col. 1, col. 4
(asserting that the Baker initiative is not dead because the three basic prongs of its strategy-growth-
oriented adjustment, structural adjustment, and new bank money-are still valid and neces-
sary)[hereinafter Citicorp's Reed].
81 Semkow, supra note 55, at 899.
82 The United States banking system is regulated by the overlapping jurisdictions of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("FRB"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("Comptroller" or "OCC"), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). See Frie-
sen, The Regulation of International Lending: Part I, 19 INT'L LAW. 1059, 1068-70 (1985). This
structure oversees reserve and lending guidelines of the federal banking law which affects member
banks of the Federal Reserve System, nationally-chartered banks, and federally insured state banks.
The complex United States regulatory system is interesting because despite the detail of its
rules, the discretion of the regulators has left much flexibility in the system.
A number of commentators have referred to the "formal and legalistic character" of banking
regulation and supervision in the United States. ... It is commonly acknowledged that a com-
plex regulatory structure has helped to insulate the banking system from "executive interference
and discretion." . . . But a corollary has been the development of equally elaborate means of
circumventing rules and regulations not desired by commercial banks.
Id. at 1068 n.42 [citations omitted]. This circumvention, whatever the cause, is quite important in
the sovereign debt context. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
The existence of banks falling outside the OCC's, the FRB's, and the FDIC's regulatory gaze
will not be addressed in this Comment. "Only a handful of state-chartered nonmember noninsured
banks are in existence, and they are not significant lenders." Friesen, supra, at 1069 (citing Scott,
The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977)).
83 Reference to contract law here refers not only to the legal system which would come into play
during litigation, but the assumption of the freedom to contract and terminate contracts implicit in
discrete conceptions of commercial association which the loan agreement implicates by its harsh and
discrete wording. See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
84 The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 ("ILSA"), 12 U.S.C: § 3901 et seq. (Supp.
IV 1986). The regulations implementing ILSA are found at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.6-.10 (1987)(OCC regu-
lations governing nationally-chartered banks); 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.41-.45 (1987)(governing Federal
Reserve System banks under the supervision of the FRB); 12 C.F.R. §§ 351.1-.3 (1987)(FDIC regu-
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lar. The second, more active form (though rarely documented) is
through the brokering, encouragement, and management of particular
restructurings through the regulator's informal, discretionary oversight
role. Therefore, both formal and informal regulation act as an external
force in the sovereign debt relation.
From the accounting standpoint, clarifications of ambiguities in the
accounting rules since the beginning of the debt crisis now require that
interest due cannot be accounted as paid on if more than ninety days
overdue.85 Banks must confront missed loan payments under the formal
loan agreement sooner because of the requirement that they place such
overdue loans on "nonaccrual" status.86 This tightening of accounting
procedures is only part of the accounting process, as the valuation of the
loans themselves remains largely intact under regulation of the federal
agencies and private auditors, despite a true market value below the orig-
inal amount of the loan.
Under ILSA, federal regulators were given additional oversight
mandates and power to require special reserves when long-term problems
in a debtor country were present.87 Despite the purpose of the Act to
compel banks to acknowledge past lending practices,88 however, the my-
opic practice of preserving interest profits through reschedulings re-
mained intact under administration of the law.
Bank regulators, through the Interagency Country Exposure Re-
view Committee ("ICERC"),8 9 periodically evaluate the debt situations
lations governing federally insured state banks). See generally Lichenstein, The US. Response to the
International Debt Crisis: The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 401
(1985); Friesen, supra note 82, at 1068-85.
85 Under previous practice, the 90-day limit for accounting of interest on loans was "bent" by
banks so that overdue interest could often be accounted as earnings. See Friesen, supra note 82, at
1071 n.53. After clarification, the accounting status of the interest was tightened, and the need to
cover outstanding interest on loans in the non-accrual status before a bank's accounting quarter
lapsed was made more immediate. See Link, The Value of Bank Assets Subject to Transfer Risk, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 77-78 (1984).
86 "The date on which a loan reaches nonaccrual status is determined by the contractual terms
of the loan." Comptroller and FRB, Joint Policy Statement on Nonaccrual Status of Loans, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) % 86,017 (June 11, 1984).
87 12 U.S.C. § 3904.
88 The legislation was passed after congressional complaints against the support of banks which
had become overexposed in their cascade of lending during the 1970s and 1980s. As Senator Garn
stated: "the price of an $8.4 billion increase in the IMF authorization in Congress is going to be
legislation so that lawmakers can go home and report that 'we did not bail out the banks.'" Rejec-
tion of Supervision Plan Clouds Convention, Fin. Times, Apr. 18, 1983, quoted in Freisen, supra note
82, at 1070.
89 This committee was created in 1978 and is composed of members of the Comptroller, the
FRB, and the FDIC. Friesen, supra note 82, at 1079. Information on the operation of this body is
difficult to locate. For a rare account of the committee's operations, see Mystery Surrounds Agenda,
Decisions of Foreign Loan Review Committee, Nat'l J., Sept. 21. 1985, at 2136.
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of about twenty countries, in terms of United States lenders. The
ICERC country risk examination system consists of:
(a) identifying countries with actual, imminent and potential debt servicing
problems, (b) citing loans to countries with actual or imminent debt
problems for the attention of bank management in examination reports,
(c) including "special comments" in bank examination reports when loans
to countries with potential debt problems exceed certain levels in relation to
bank capital, and (d) evaluating the internal systems used by banks to man-
age country exposures.
90
The major sanction arising from this review under statute is the require-
ment of an allocated transfer risk reserve ("ATRR") for "protracted in-
ability" of foreign debtors "to make payment on their external
indebtedness"9' where prospects for an "orderly restoration of debt ser-
vice" are remote.92 This regulation has great potential for channeling
banks' behavior, depending on how aggressively the regulators imple-
ment their appraisal process. 93 Establishing the reserve improves the fi-
nancial security of the bank by allocating a cushion for the initial damage
default would have upon the banks' assets. 94 A bank may also skirt the
ATRR requirement by writing off the value of the loan from its books.95
Either way, the formal contract terms grow increasingly important as
90 Friesen, supra note 82, at 1079-80.
91 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(b)(2)(ii)(1), 211.43(b)(2)(ii)(1), 351.1(b)(2)(ii)(1) (1987). Factors which go
into the determination of "protracted inability" include, inter alia, interest payments, compliance
with the terms of a restructuring, and failure to comply with an IMF or similar adjustment program.
92 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(b)(2)(ii)(2), 211.43(b)(2)(ii)(2), 351.I(b)(2)(ii)(2) (1987).
93 To date, only Zaire, the Sudan, Nicaragua, Poland, Bolivia, and Peru have been placed in the
ATRR category. See Regulator Lists Countries Whose Loans Require Special Reserves at U.S.
Banks, Wall St. J., July 24, 1985; U.S. Tells Banks with Peru Loans to Set Aside Reserves on Expo-
sure, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1985 (Midwest ed.). Neither Brazil nor Ecuador has been placed in this
category yet, despite those countries' moratoriums on external debt payments since 1987. Had the
language in the law been drafted more stringently, the regulators would not have the discretion to
ignore such protracted inability and unwillingness to pay. One wonders whether such flexibility is
necessary. See infra note 94. While more informal regulatory methods by the ICERC are said to
exist, see Friesen, supra note 82, at 1080 n.92 (quoting R. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION AROUND THE
WORLD 65 (Group of Thirty 1982)), it does not appear that these methods have been any more
effective in modifying banks' behavior than the formal statutory powers. See Citicorp Accepts a Big
Loss Linked to Foreign Loans, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1987, at Al, col. 1 (federal regulators stressing
that "Citicorp's decision was strictly on its own.")[hereinafter Citicorp Accepts Loss].
94 The relational practice of crisis myopia persisted primarily because Congress gave great dis-
cretion to the regulators in their finding of protracted inability. See 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(1). Since a
similar amount of discretion exists in the level of ATRR allocations once the authorities make the
necessary findings ("The initial year's provision of the ATRR shall be ten percent of the principal
* . .or such greater or lesser percentage determined by the Federal banking agencies." 12 C.F.R.
§§ 20.8(b)(2)(ii)(B); 211.43(b)(2)(ii)(B); 351.l(b)(2)(ii)(B) (1987)), perhaps too much discretion was
given to the regulators in light of the legislation's intent. The fact that the banking authorities use
discretion to skirt a finding of protracted inability rather than reducing the levels of ATRR required
of troubled debtors, undercuts the formal contract by leaving the banks to their own regulation.
95 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(c)(4), 211.43(c)(4), 351.1(b)(3)(iv) (1987).
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banks are forced to recognize the low value of sovereign loans on their
books through market pressure and the oversight of private auditors. 96
By requiring a small amount of reserves for only the most indebted of
countries, however, and leaving the very finding of necessity for the
ATRR completely to the regulators' discretion, ILSA has failed to work
many substantive changes in banks' restructuring policies. Instead, the
banks reinvigorated the formal obligations of the loan agreement by es-
tablishing loan loss reserves themselves. 97
The reason ad hoe restructuring has been preserved under ILSA
may be the great value to the regulators of this flexible process.98 The
post-ILSA regulatory structure maintains the flexibility of the system to
react to particular country shocks, rather than demanding that develop-
ing country debts be approached in a comprehensive manner. In addi-
tion, banks have been given the opportunity to develop innovative
financial devices to arrive at restructured loans, without requiring that
reserves be applied automatically wherever they might be legally
justified.
The second way in which the regulatory system intervenes in re-
structuring is through informal brokering of a restructuring negotiated
by the lead creditor banks. This can be done in several ways, an obvious
one being the provision of government funds or guarantees as part of the
restructuring package, as in the most recent Mexican restructuring.99 A
less obvious way is through political coaxing of the banks to subscribe to
a restructuring package where the incentive for them to participate is
low. 100 To overcome this reluctance, the regulatory authorities often use
96 See Auditors Press Banks to Bite Bullet on Foreign Loans, Wall. St. J., June 8, 1987, at 6, col. 1
(Midwest ed.).
97 See infra note 128. The ATRR has thus become a way to impose a minimum level of reserves
on banks which refuse to follow the market, rather than the protective device it was originally
designed to act as. With the failure of the ICERC to classify Ecuador and Brazil as value-impaired
loans, it is obvious the federal regulators are content to leave the banks in the ad hoc restructuring
mode.
98 See Friesen, supra note 82, at 1068 (quoting FRB Chairman Volcker as saying "we already
have a process that seems to work").
99 In the Mexico restructuring, government zero-coupon bonds were provided by the United
States government to guarantee a portion of the rescheduled debt. See New Way Offered to Relieve
Crisis in 3d World Debt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1987, at Al, col. 6 [hereinafter New Way].
100 Typically banks are asked to contribute new money proportionate to their "base rate" of debt
existing at a set date before the major debt troubles began. The base rate is calculated on the bank's
exposure as of a particular date before the original problems with the developing country began. See
W. CLINE, MOBILIZING, supra note 78, at 13. Some banks, however, particularly smaller ones, may
have reduced their exposure prior to restructuring by writing off the losing loan from their books,
and are thus being asked to contribute new money based on a loan exposure which no longer exists.
Id. at 6. Even if the bank did not write off the loan, it may feel that its exposure is small enough, or
that its reserves are great enough, so that placing the loan in the non-accrual category or writing it
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political pressure to coerce the lenders into signing on with the syndi-
cate's restructuring, in addition to the methods used by banks among
themselves. 101
In short, the United States regulators have done little to disrupt the
parties' informal behavior under the sovereign debt relation. If anything,
the ad hoc restructuring process has been strengthened while the govern-
mental goal of bank stability, seemingly embedded in the ILSA, has been
achieved outside the legal mechanisms of the Act.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL
Since the vast portion of the sovereign debt relationship takes place
outside the technical terms of the contract over an indefinite time, rela-
tional contract theory seems ideally suited to explain and analyze the
process. The inextricable nature of the relation, the incremental process
of agreement, 10 2 and the complex interaction of external, relational, and
internal legal interests combine'0 3 to render discrete conceptions and de-
scriptions of contract problematic, if not obsolete.t04 The principles of
relational exchange outlined earlier exist in the sovereign debt relation,
but are not easily identified or explained by discrete legal terms. Rather,
functional/relational analysis must be used in order to gauge the effec-
off completely would not threaten its security. Since the decrease in exposure fostered by write off
does not affect the base rate on which each bank's contribution is calculated, the incentive for refus-
ing to make the new money contribution is greater with each restructuring. See also W. CLINE,
INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 78-81.
101 See Worries Deepen, supra note 57 (one of the few news reports mentioning the political force
necessary to push through some restructurings). The coercion and persuasion necessary to gain the
new money contributions will be greater as restructured loans increase their concessionary financial
terms-i.e. lower interest and new money on a non-discretionary basis. Such concessions appear to
be the trend, at least for the larger debtors. See LMF.-Style Pact Seen for Brazil, N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, 1987, at 25, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); Mexico's IMF Loan Approved as Banks Commit to Package, Wall
St. J., Nov. 20, 1986, at 30, col. 4 (nat'l ed.). Because the regulatory authorities maintain a great deal
of discretion over such things as mergers and scrutiny of inspections, failing to sign onto an impor-
tant restructuring might result in sanctions applied to the bank's other business activities. T. Link,
Guest Lecturer, International Financial Markets Class (Northwestern University School of Law,
Nov. 20-21, 1986). See also D. LOMAX, supra note 3, at 135.
102 A major behavioral trait of relational contracts is that they are formed over time during "an
incremental process in which parties gather increasing information and gradually agree to more and
more as they proceed. Indeed, the very process of exercising choice in such circumstances ... may
entail major parts of the total costs of the whole project as finally agreed." Macneil, Rich Classifica-
tory Apparatus, supra note 40, at 1041. To any who have followed a sovereign restructuring through
the media, this fact is evident. See Mexico Given Debt Aid by 'Paris Club' Nations, N.Y. Times, Sept.
18, 1986, at 2, col. 5; Spotlight on Loans for Mexico, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1986, at 34, col. 1 (nat'l
ed.); Volcker Acts to End Mexican Loan Impasse, Fin. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (int'l ed.);
Mexico Lenders Agree to Join Rescue Package, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 31, col. I (nat'l ed.).
103 See generally Macneil, Values, supra note 42.
104 See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
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tiveness of the loan relation.1
0 5
In approaching each of the roles of contract in the sovereign debt
context, the legitimacy test first demonstrates how informal behavior
compromises formal functions in the document. To the extent formal
aspects of the relation are undermined, the institutions which usurp the
functions of contract will be assessed for relational effectiveness to judge
if improvements can be made. The basic principles of relational con-
tract-reciprocity through exchange and planning of performance (the
substance and procedure of exchange, respectively)-have been an active
part in the development of the sovereign loan relation and will provide
drafting principles for the lawyer considering the loan agreement from a
normative perspective.
A. Fostering Reciprocity Through Exchange
Exchange is the cornerstone of modern economic relations in both
the international and domestic arena.10 6 In order to foster exchange in
contractual relations, reciprocity between the actors must be promoted.
Reciprocity is fulfillment of goals to the mutual benefit of each party
through procedures spelled out or based on the contract. 10 7 The contrac-
tual goals are either explicit or implicit in the terms of the document. In
relational exchanges, goals are spread throughout the formal and infor-
mal legal systems.
The sovereign loan agreement has an obvious objective on its face:
exchange of money for present use by the sovereign for repayment of the
principal and interest to the creditor over time. 108 This literal reciproc-
ity, however, is a legal fiction when compared to the restructuring cycle
of which each contract is merely a documentary by-product. The fact
that loan agreements are usually nothing more than worst case scenarios
and precedent documents leads one to question their effectiveness com-
pared to the parties' actual relation. The remedies and rights of the con-
tract assure reciprocity only in the discrete ideal of the lawyer's mind. 109
In the real world, relational and external interests undermine each
105 See supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
106 See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(E. Cannan ed. 1937)(Ist ed. 1775).
107 Macneil, Values, supra note 42, at 375.
108 Factors other than profit included a necessity to funnel off the petro-dollar deposits of the
1970s as well as maintain prestige in international banking. See generally A. SAMPSON, supra note 1,
ch. 2.
109 See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text. Should the sovereign default, the government's
assets may be set-off against the loan upon acceleration by the creditors; breach of any of the mate-
rial provisions of the loan to which the borrower has agreed, also bestows the right of acceleration.
See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
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party's freedom to exercise its rights under the contract and terminate
the relation." 0 The reciprocal freedom which allows "efficient breach"
by either party under conventional thinking is hijacked by costs in the
relation far greater than in traditional contract."' The sheer magnitude
of the sovereign loan makes such economically rational thinking com-
pletely irrational.
Acceleration, despite the fact of technical default, is rarely if ever
employed. Such action would wreak havoc on the accelerating banks,
the domestic economy of the sovereign, and the international capital
markets." 2 In fact, due to the large amounts of debt loaned by the
banks, relational and external forces affect the formal legitimacy of the
contract almost immediately.' " On the borrower's side, the existence of
short-term trade credits, inter-governmental relations, and public welfare
considerations demand that the sovereign's cost horizons include interna-
tional and social calculations, as well as simply economic ones." 4 From
the creditor's point of view, any acceleration is impossible except for the
most paltry sums." 5 In both instances, external, internal, and relational
factors overpower the discrete terms of the contract." 6 These forces im-
pose a categorical rule upon the loan relation-never litigate, never accel-
erate, and never exercise the substantive legal rights of the formal
contract.
The enormous profits and prestige of the loan which prompted
banks to lend to developing countries in the 1970s were quickly forgotten
once a pattern of increasing levels of rescheduling developed. 1 7 This
1 10 Recall that the freedom to contract and breach accounts for the necessary flexibility of con-
tract in classical and neoclassical legal systems. See supra note 13.
111 See Ohlin, Economic Risks in Sovereign Loan Agreements, in SOVEREIGN BORROWERS, supra
note 6, at 10, 19. The contract law of the state guards this right through imposing a duty to cover
(which curbs the power of one party to damage the other by inefficient use of the right) and princi-
ples of contract mutuality (which protect this right of contractual autonomy from being coercively
denied one party by another).
112 "[Tlhere is an astonishing paucity of litigation involving claims by U.S. banks on foreign
sovereign debtors." Reisner, supra note 2, at 6.
113 This is reflected in the ignorance of the usual forms of risk calculation when lending to sover-
eign borrowers and the belief that sovereigns can never go bankrupt. Id. at 5.
114 See W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 87-93.
115 Sovereign governments are unlikely to have more than a couple of billion dollars in attachable
funds within a given jurisdiction named in the contract as the situs of debt. Set-off will be severely
limited by this fact, and a repudiating sovereign is likely to withdraw its funds from banks before
acceleration is declared. Finally, any acceleration of debt by creditors will be likely to translate into
censure of the bank or banks by the sovereign in future relations. See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 570-
73.
116 See id.
117 Professor Macneil considers patterns of constant increase a status quo within a relational
contract. See Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 888.
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glaring formal illegitimacy leads one to search the informal relation for
the reciprocal goals which relational contract theory proves must be pro-
moted for the relationship to continue. If such a reciprocity is absent in
the relation, then exchange is not being accomplished and the parties
have no reason to continue the relation.
Within the informal system of the relation, the sovereign's long-term
goal in restructuring is a return to voluntary lending markets. This
would restore political and economic sovereignty sacrificed by the re-
structuring's requirements of austerity'1 8 while allowing access to volun-
tary loans with which the country can spur economic growth.
Simultaneously, the banks' goal is to reduce and diversify international
exposure and meet accounting regulations so that bank capital and earn-
ings are safe from the losses which problem loans impose. The short-
sighted goal of meeting interest payments,.which is reinforced by the reg-
ulatory system, demands that the long-range goals remain unfulfilled.
The vigor with which this more substantial mutual interest can be pur-
sued is diluted by external forces, and relational effectiveness is therefore
sacrificed from the substantive reciprocity standpoint. There is no real
exchange; moreover, the underlying transaction is not performing a func-
tion which will allow it to continue into the future, as the interdependent.
nature of the parties demands.
Under the United States regulatory system, banks must ensure that
interest is paid so that loans are not classified as non-performing as-
sets.119 Such an action would plunge large creditors into trouble, as the
adequacy of their earnings and capital was questioned by the public, 120
the interbank market,12 ' and the regulators themselves.
From the relational point of view, the ad hoe restructuring process
118 Some debtors have spurned the assistance of the IMF because of austerity required as a condi-
tion for the help, which in turn is used as a benchmark for negotiations with commercial banks.
Peru, for example, has defied the IMFs policies since 1985. Peru Defiant After IMF Acts to Deny
New Credit, Fin. Times, Aug. 8, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (int'l ed.). Brazil has been the largest country to
spurn IMF austerity and avoid it in negotiations with developed nations. Brazil Gets Flexible Debt
Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at 29, col. 6 (nat'l ed.). Even without austerity, the drain debt
service has on a country's economy is substantial.
119 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text; see also Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1987 (Midwest
ed.)(The United States regulatory framework discouraged an "enlightened approach" in recent Mex-
ican restructuring).
120 See Berg, Banks' Reserves and Latin Loans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at 38, col. 3 (nat'l
ed.)(examining the effect of the write-offs of one large bank holding company on large creditors of
the Latin American countries); Dow Drops 1& 70; Bank Issues Hurt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1987, at
29, col. 6 (nat'l ed.)(report of stock market reaction to news that Brazil had suspended its interest
payments).
121 Rg., D. LOMAX, supra note 3, at 172-175 (describing the collapse of the Continental Illinois
Bank in 1984).
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resembles an institution half-way between bankruptcy and loan, without
the safeguards and purposiveness of the statutory outlet, or the flexibility
of discrete contract doctrine. 122 Terms are spread out and relief for cred-
itors is allowed, but there is never any hope that the debts can be for-
given. Thus, the creditors have very little satisfaction of their original
loans, and the debtor gets very little relief from interest payments.
Though reciprocity may be present in the give and take of renegotiation
and the letter of the loan agreement, it is distinctly absent in the sub-
stance of the restructuring regime. Purposive exchange is absent.
The sovereign loan agreement in a restructuring cycle becomes the
formal component of a relation crafted with the sole hope that the world
economy will eventually carry the developing nation "into the black"
through export earnings from the international economy. 123 Such an in-
formal purpose amounts to a relational paradox: the sovereign and syndi-
cate strive to preserve the relation in hopes that circumstances in the
international economy will terminate the restructuring regime. 124 The
reality of relational contract theory, with its emphasis on real exchange,
cannot allow such a substantive lack of reciprocity to occur. Quite sim-
ply, the parties will be unable to continue the relation under the pure ad
hoe restructuring regime. A contractual relation built upon such a fatal-
istic premise cannot survive while ignoring the formal contractual free-
dom of the loan agreement. Either substantive financial reform of
restructuring must take place to promote greater reciprocity in the rela-
tion, or the contractual freedom existing in the document must be re-
stored. Either way, the sovereign loan relation cannot remain at the
status quo of rescheduling.
In fact, the lessons of this paradox in relational contract are borne
out by the innovative financial terms of the 1986 Mexican restructuring
and others which have followed. These restructurings have moved away
from traditional rescheduling and towards more pointed exchange.
125
122 Cf. Oechsli, Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305 (1981).
123 This resolution would entail gradual retirement of debt on or close to previously renegotiated
schedules. See Gurria-Trevino, Negotiations With Transnational Banks: A Sovereign Borrower's Per-
spective, in 2 INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, supra note 5, at 5.3A.1. For an empirical model which
suggested this was possible before the Mexican restructuring, see W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL
DEBT, supra note 3, at 44-72.
124 To do this the liquidity crises which are the cause of periodic default scares must be lessened
in degree and frequency so that exports can carry the country on its rescheduled payback. W.
CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT, supra note 3, at 71-73.
125 See Mexico Debt Link Seen as Precedent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at 25, col. 3 (nat'l
ed.)[hereinafter Mexico Debt Link]. Commercial banks agreed to automatic new money loans over
the next few years if certain targets in economic growth were not reached. In addition, the largest




Such reform may reinvigorate the reciprocity lost in sovereign loans if
the internal goals of the parties are more effectively promoted. Viewed in
this way, the Mexican restructuring is not only a strong precedent for
developing countries weary of rescheduling, but also an indication of the
direction all sovereign loan relations must take if they are to remain via-
ble relational exchanges in the interdependent world economy. Real ex-
change must be injected into sovereign loan relations. 126 Only if this
occurs can relational effectiveness be restored.
From the perspective of formal contract, it is also clear that lenders
are placing themselves in positions where contract autonomy can be
more easily exercised through declaration of default and litigation.
127
The recent international trend of setting aside reserves against developing
country debt 128 thus not only ensures stability in international banking,
but also reduces the need for restructuring through a greater ability of
banks to declare default or refuse to restructure.12 9 This point may be
less significant in marking a trend towards greater respect for the formal
contract, however, than a trend towards admitting that substance must
be injected into future restructurings. The establishment of greater
reserves clears the way for restructurings utilizing the discount of loans
as required for conversion to equity or some other innovation.
1 30
Under either interpretation, it is clear that the basic principles of
relational exchange are being recognized in sovereign loan relations. Of
ceived a majority in the largest private conglomerate in Mexico in return for the forgiveness of the
entity's foreign debt. Banks to Get Stake in Mexico Concern, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1986, at 37, col. 6
(nat'l ed.).
126 See Mexico Debt Link, supra note 125, at 25, col. 3; see also Siddiqi, supra note 61, at 46.
127 An example (more illustrative than probative) is found in the declaration of default by credi-
tors of North Korea in August 1987. Western Creditors Declare N Korea in Formal Default, Fin.
Times, Aug. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 3 (int'l ed.). Simply put, the creditors were unwilling to reschedule
the loans further and front the new money which North Korea requested. The fact that North
Korea is not a very big borrower (only around $2.57 billion in total debt) probably accounts for the
choice to declare default. United States banks are barred by legislation from lending to North
Korea.
128 Between Citibank's original $3 billion charge to earnings, see Citicorp Accepts Loss, supra note
93, and the end of summer 1987, many international lenders had boosted loan loss reserves signifi-
cantly. See Regional Banks Taking a Double Dose of Medicine on Foreign and US. Loans, Wall St.
J., June 16, 1987, at 2, col. 3; Canadian Banks Bite Debt Bullet, Fin. Times, Aug. 25, 1987, at 15, col.
4 (int'l ed.); An Even More Bitter Pill, Financial Times, June 17, 1987, at 22, col. 3 (int'l
ed.)(recounting U.K. banks' reserve positions). At the end of 1987, an even starker assessment of
Latin American loans came from the bank holding company Bank of Boston, which wrote off
(charged completely off capital) 20% of its Latin American loans and boosted reserves to over 50%
for the remainder. See Banks' Reserves and Latin Loans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at 38, col. 3
(nat'l ed.).
129 Interestingly, John Reed, chairman of Citicorp, denies that the reserves change the banks'
bargaining positions. See Citicorp's Reed, supra note 80, col. I (Midwest ed.).
130 Id.
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the myriad international reforms proposed for the debt crisis, each one
aims at greater reciprocal exchange within the debt relation than that
which exists in traditional loan rescheduling to cure short-term liquidity
shortfalls.' 3 1 The structure of the restructuring regime and the need for
substantive exchange necessarily demands that parties both internal and
external to the relation contribute towards this substantive exchange.
Since the traditional rescheduling represented a political and economic
equilibrium between the various actors, innovation comes at the expense
of internal or external interests to the relation, or more likely demands a
sacrifice from both.
1 3 2
Given the need for greater exchange in the substance of debt re-
structuring, and thus greater relational effectiveness, a question arises as
to the role of contracts in moving towards restored reciprocity in debt
relations. By applying the functional analysis to the more procedural
aspects of contract-planning and performance-possibilities for a ren-
aissance of contract are seen, and the basics of a drafting model emerge.
While the increase in substantive exchange has occurred without the ac-
tive participation of lawyers, it is possible that now that the trend has
begun, a more active role for lawyers exists and can occur through the
vehicle of the sovereign loan agreement.
B. Planning and Performance
The sovereign loan relation leaves much of the progress towards its
goals to the informal system arising under the formal contract. The rea-
son for this abdication is the great flexibility which a strict formal con-
tract grants parties operating in an unsure economic environment. 33
Unfortunately, while granting the parties tremendous flexibility, the for-
mal contract system cannot substantively promote the real goals of the
sovereign loan-ultimate retirement of the sovereign's external debt.
1 34
131 See generally F. BERGSTEN, W. CLINE & J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 93-199; W.
CLINE, MOBILIZING, supra note 78; D. LOMAX, supra note 3, at 264-80. This does not include
refinancing methods which amount to revised rescheduling schemes. See F. BERGSTEN, W. CLINE
& J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 1-92.
132 Supporting this hypothesis is the recent posturing of the Brazilian government in bypassing
commercial banks after its initial payment stop in early 1987. Brazil Talking to Nations, Not Banks,
on Debt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at 37, col. 3 [hereinafter Brazil Talking to Nations]. The newest
Mexican package is a stronger indication of this projection, where greater substantive exchange is
promoted in the restructuring, and the United States government's aid was directly involved in the
change.
133 See Ryan, Defaults and Remedies Under International Bank Loan Agreements with Foreign
Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 90. Such flexibil-
ity through strict drafting is certainly a fact of legal life in the United States commercial law system.
134 Or at least reducing the debt to the level where interest payments can be easily made without
further debt. Certainly, if the sovereign successfully fulfilled the terms of the loan agreement, the
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This substantive failing of the loan agreement as a functional tool might
lead one to expect a failure in the contract's planning role as well. Func-
tionally though, the terms which fulfill planning functions have much
relational value in the life of a restructured loan. Despite this value, law-
yers have limited their roles to drafting agreements which articulate
when and how restructurings commence, but not how the substance of
the relation occurs. The greater value of the lawyer in the sovereign loan
relation-as it drifts towards greater institutionalization and substantive
exchange-is the formality the attorney can lend to the proceedings.
Under relational contract, different kinds of planning exist between
the parties throughout their performance: "Two fundamental character-
istics of contract planning are a constant interplay between planning and
nonplanning and a distinction between performance planning and risk
planning." '35 Nonplanning "consists at most of an anticipation, vague,
or otherwise, of future cooperation or lack of it in taking the actions
necessary to make the contract work out satisfactorily ... ."136 Perform-
ance planning within the contract specifies what must be done if the con-
tract is to be successful.13 7 Risk planning spells out contingencies for
events which might arise during performance, but are not necessary for
completion of the contract. 138 While conceptually distinct when written
into a contract, as the contractual relation unfolds nonplanning melds
into planning, 13' and risk planning mirrors performance planning.1" At
the informal level, the clauses which perform a planning role also act as
vehicles for communication between the parties, by virtue of their formal
power.
A ready example of the dual roles of contract planning within the
formal sovereign loan is the business terms of the contract. Since pay-
ments and drawdowns are clearly specified, both creditors and the debtor
can plan finances to meet the obligations of the loan. If payments are not
made on time, remedies will lie against the breaching party. A further
example of the melding of performance and risk planning is the docu-
mentation which accompanies a sovereign loan. By warranting that its
mutual goal would be reached. The loan document, however, cannot actually aid in the promotion
of that goal; it is only by coincidence that the aim is fulfilled through export earnings from the world
economy.
135 I. MACNEIL, CASEBOOK, supra note 44, at 20.
136 Id. at 21.
137 Id. at 25.
138 Id. at 26.
139 The more precisely anticipation of the unplanned events is accounted for by terms of a con-
tract which might accommodate them, the more closely such vague anticipation resembles planning.
Id. at 21.
140 Id. at 26.
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financial information is correct, the sovereign is required to gather and
disseminate vast amounts of documentation to its creditors. This process
aids performance of the loan through facilitating management of liquid-
ity by the sovereign. The creditors can utilize documentation to monitor
the sovereign's financial health.141
The negative pledge142 has a similar dual planning and performance
function. By periodically representing that no prior claim has been
placed over that of the debtors, the sovereign assures the lenders that
their security is intact, thus fulfilling a risk planning function for the
lender.143 If the sovereign manages its finances well, the necessity of giv-
ing such a prior claim will be avoided. This clause thus promotes plan-
ning to avoid granting security superior to that of the restructuring
creditors. 4
This duality is the functional "meat" of the sovereign loan agree-
ment. The true power of the protective contract clause lies in its role as a
trigger of the restructuring process, not in the technical consequences of
default. Acceleration"' is "primarily important to bank lenders for get-
ting the attention of and negotiating with a financially or otherwise trou-
bled debtor, or with other creditors of the borrower, in order to effect
other measures like restructuring the credit. .. ""' The extreme conse-
quences of a default promote communication between the illiquid sover-
eign and the profit-conscious creditors. 47 Of course, the more strict and
detailed the covenants and events of default are, the less flexibility the
borrower will have in attempting to stave off the financial crisis which
will require restructuring. 148
Once restructuring has begun, the contract continues to assert itself
141 Walter, supra note 51, at 71, 86-88. See generally Kalderefi, supra note 59, at 38.
142 See supra note 66.
143 Breach of the negative pledge signals to the lender that nonpayment of the loan is likely since
the sovereign felt compelled to bestow prior interest; action can be taken to stave off the crisis. See
Youard, supra note 67, at 176, 178.
144 See Siddiqi, supra note 61, at 58.
145 Should an event of default remain uncured after a stipulated period in the contract, the lend-
ers have the right to accelerate the loan: "the right to terminate the lending commitment and to
declare due and payable any outstanding loans." Venkatachari, supra note 66, at 92-93.
146 Id. "An event of default may portent economic losses to international banks, and the legal
sanctions that accompany such an event may significantly influence borrower behavior." Walter,
supra note 51, at 71.
147 The structure of the sovereign's loans is such that default on even one loan would cause cross-
default on many others before renegotiation would be commenced. Only by clear communication
with all debtors can the transaction costs which are necessitated by restructuring-bookkeeping,
negotiation, maintenance of credit lines-be kept at a minimum.
148 See Cone, The Treatment of Default, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING: CORPORATE AND




in the planning and form of the restructuring. Documentation from the
predecessor loan and rights previously agreed to give the parties a basis
for renegotiation and bargaining. 49 Yet the contract will only have ef-
fectiveness within the limited scope of its writing. The contract will have
little or no effect on the negotiation or substance of the restructuring.
The transient nature of the loan agreement, even in the context of more
substantive exchange in restructurings, is disturbing. Given the resurrec-
tion of substance in the sovereign loan agreement, why is there not a
resurrection of process? Why is the restructuring process itself not set
out in the contract?
The failure of the contract to specify a procedure between default
and normal performance of the loan has not been considered a real prob-
lem in sovereign loan contracts.' 50 Lenders are unwilling to accept spe-
cific renegotiation procedures without acceleration because negotiations
absent this right may leave creditors with little bargaining power.' 5 ' In
addition, "the situation at the time of renegotiation cannot be foreseen
accurately enough to enable the lenders to know what they are commit-
ting themselves to."' 52 By leaving the de facto remedy of restructuring
out of the contract, crucial flexibility in approaching liquidity shortfalls
is maintained.
The formal performance and planning clauses of the sovereign loan
agreement appear to maintain legitimacy in the informal system up to the
moment restructuring commences. The substantive reforms now being
seen in certain countries' restructurings, 153 however, may require a
change in the unwritten status of restructuring in loan agreements. Now
that substantive terms of the loan relation are promoting more pur-
poseful exchange between the parties, it is possible that the procedural
aspects of the loan agreement might extend past the life of the agree-
ment's payment obligation.
One example lies in the power of precedent in the sovereign debt
field. Before the recognition that substantive exchange was needed in the
sovereign loan relation, the loan contract was an effective instrument in
traditional reschedulings of sovereign debt. With the treatment of debt-
ors varying even more in recent episodes due to increased innovation,
failure to monitor debtors' economic situations effectively 1 54 may give
149 Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 572-74 (citing Ryan, supra note 133, at 90).
150 See Youard, supra note 67, at 178-79.
151 Id. at 178.
152 Id.
153 See supra notes 125-32.
154 Traditionally, the IMF has performed the monitoring function by focusing on targets of aus-
terity imposed when renegotiating IMF financings. See generally Nowzad, The Role of the IMF in
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smaller debtors155 incentive to halt payments prematurely in order to
force creditors' hands. This may occur even where traditional reschedul-
ing is viable.156 In order to police such "bad faith" invocation of restruc-
turing, arbitration on the issue of financial necessity might be required'
5 7
before restructuring is undertaken. 158 Such a contractual practice--or
variations upon it-may be the quid pro quo for grander and more inno-
vative restructurings. The advantage such formalism would have is that
ad hoc restructuring would be gradually formalized out of existence,
while still maintaining the individualism which has stabilized the world
economy up to this point. In short, the restructuring parties would set
up their own formal law, subject to objective dispute resolution proce-
dures, in recognition that more substantive restructurings would have to
be monitored carefully in order to obtain the support of the international
financial system.
V. CONCLUSION: RESURRECTION OF CONTRACT IN AN
INSTITUTIONALIZED DEBT REGIME
"To have even a glimmer of hope of understanding relational con-
tract we must overcome the impact hundreds of years of history have
had on our minds." '15 9 Indeed, at the end this work appears to be noth-
ing more than a theoretically based echo of the call heard earlier in the
1980s, at the onset of the debt crisis: that "lenders as well as borrowers
... in the event of actual or threatened default... put to one side all
Rescheduling International Debt, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING, supra note 148, at 131;
Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11 (1984). Several countries have refused resort to the IMF as a matter
of principle, however, leaving a void to be filled by the informal planning procedures of the loan
agreement which may not be enough in many cases. See supra note 118.
155 Without the leverage of a Mexico or Brazil.
156 See, e.g., Ecuador Failed to Make January Debt Payment, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at 30,
col. 1 (nat'l ed.)(Former manager of central bank says decision not to pay was a tactic to gain more
favorable terms. Ecuador was viewed by bankers as a "bright spot" in international debt).
157 Despite some misgivings by bank counsel early on in the debt troubles, see Ryan, supra note
133, at 128-31, arbitration is now accepted in contracts between sovereigns and syndicates. See
Delaume, Special Risk and Remedies of International Sovereign Loans, in DEFAULT AND
RESCHEDULING, supra note 148, at 91, 100-03 (1984).
158 Although provisions barring bad faith halts in interest payment could certainly be written into
loan agreements enforceable by developed country courts, eg., Ryan, supra note 133, at 101-02, the
point of arbitration before restructuring is to provide alternate procedures before litigation is
threatened, thereby avoiding the extreme consequences of acceleration which trap parties into re-
structuring in the first place. In addition, by stipulating intermediary procedures before restructur-
ing, greater cooperation between the parties, reduced costs through specialization, eg., Ohlin, supra
note 111, at 28, and a change in the prevalent spirit of "fault" during debt restructuring might be
accomplished. See, e.g., Cone, supra note 148, at 25.
159 Macneil, Adjustment of Relations, supra note 11, at 885.
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notions of wrongdoing and focus[] exclusively on the objective content
of their common problem."' I6 The trend now, however, is not just a
shift from adversarial restructuring, but towards greater institutionaliza-
tion of sovereign debt refinancing in the international economy.
Due to chinks in the traditional rescheduling armor of creditor
banks brought on by the realities of relational exchange, precedent is er-
oding the legitimacy of ad hoc restructuring for smaller as well as larger
debtors. The lack of substantive reciprocity and exchange in traditional
restructuring has led to wider acceptance of innovative approaches.161 In
addition, the sovereign debt landscape has begun to resemble that of a
normal financial market, with the rise of a secondary market in debt,'62 a
growing debt-for-equity swap practice in many nations' loans,163 and for
the first time, the possibility of converting sovereign debt into interna-
tionally backed bonds.' 6 If this trend continues, it is possible that the
liquidity crisis of the future may be no more than another problem for
investment bankers to resolve with some innovative finance offering, akin
to those now flourishing on the Euro-market.
The lawyer has an active role to play in this process. For years,
detailed sovereign loan contracts have granted flexibility to the relational
actors while the governmental regulators were content to see the out-
come of the rescheduling cycle. Important interests in contractual for-
mality were sacrificed in this ad hoc restructuring regime. Trading
flexibility for formality may be a way to protect such interests in the
future. 16
5
Relational theory may not act as a perfect predictor of the economic
future for sovereign debt. The outcome of the debt crisis depends ulti-
mately on the world economy. Given that the nature of sovereign debt is
160 Cone, supra note 148, at 25. Cf Hoeflich, supra note 77.
161 See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text. For one of the most frank views by bankers,
government officials, and economists on trends in sovereign debt, see Official Transcript of the U.S.
Congressional Summit on Debt and Trade, New York City (Dec. 3-5, 1986)(available from Smick-
Medley & Associates, Washington, D.C.); see also Buq, Debt Crisis: Fresh Approaches, N.Y. Times,
May 5, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.)(describing several innovations in debt restructuring).
162 See supra note 57.
163 Eg., U.S. Banks Swap Latin Debt, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1986, at 29, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
164 See Brazil Talking to Nations, supra note 132 (Brazil may push for bond conversion of its
external debt in the upcoming restructuring); New Way, supra note 99 (most recent Mexican restruc-
turing, where the United States government backed zero-coupon bonds); see also Alpern & Emerson,
Making Life Easier for Debtor Nations, N.Y. Times, at 15, col. 1 (nat'l ed). See generally F. BERG-
STEN, ,V. CLINE & J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 93-199; W. CLINE, MOBILIZING, supra note
78.
165 John Reed of Citibank has called for "a more textured and somewhat more market-related set
of agreements" in sovereign loan restructurings. Citicorp's Reed, supra note 80, col. 1. Contractual
formality may be the lawyers' procedural contribution to this substantive need.
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changing, however, relational theory can serve as a drafting model for
the lawyer asked to craft the contract needed to govern a successful re-
structuring. 166 Relational theory can also point to principles which must
be respected in all relational exchanges. By isolating the various legal
aspects of the sovereign debt relation and applying a functional analysis
similar to that presented here, practitioners can "develop a new norma-
tive structure to accommodate and regulate" 167 the restructuring regime
as it evolves into the 1990s. The existence of institutionalism and the
growing attraction of formalism may indicate a resurrection of contract
in the sovereign debt field. Lawyers should take the initiative and sug-
gest to their clients the use of formal contract as a functional part of debt
restructuring. While such tools may not solve the debt crisis, they may
serve to better justify attorneys' fees.
Keith A. Palzer
166 One would expect the same specialization of legal documentation to develop in the future
sovereign debt regime which arose in Euro-market offerings. See Wood, supra note 56, at 131-32.
167 Macneil, Rich Classificatory Apparatus, supra note 40, at 1039.
